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Pauline tenets of Christ's divinity, and the supersession of the Mosaic law.

The writer of the Gospel of Barnabas has used our canonical gospels freely, and is singularly free from the silly extra-canonical miracles connected with the birth and babyhood of Jesus. The main thesis of the long document seems to be the subordination of Jesus. Again and again, in the most solemn moments of his ministry (as at the raising of Lazarus) Jesus exclaims, "I am a man like yourselves," "I shall die like yourselves," or even pronounces a solemn curse on any who should call him Son of God. The Roman Senate even enacts a decree that Jesus shall not be called Son of God, on pain of death, and has the decree engraved in copper and posted in the Temple. Yet the author of the Gospel lets the name *Christ* stand for Jesus, while violently denying that he is the Messiah (who is Mohammed): a queer bit of philological ignorance for a man who knows enough to turn *παράκλητος* into *περικλυτός*, the latter word corresponding to Allah, "the Renowned." How unskilfully the author has combined his discordant material is shown by the fact that one of the most marvelous of Jesus' miracles (the feeding of the Five Thousand) follows the very chapter in which the Roman Senate posts the copper engraved decree in the Temple.

Whether or not the Gospel is based on the gnostic apocryphal *Evangelium Barnabae*, mentioned in the Gelasian Decree (vi, 10), must remain undetermined for want of sufficient data. However, one strikingly gnostic trait in the Gospel is the docetic account of the crucifixion, according to which Judas himself was miraculously transformed into the likeness of Jesus (even to the deception of the disciples themselves), and crucified in his stead, Jesus being caught up by God into heaven.

DAVID S. MUZZEY

NEW YORK

THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

The author of *The Christian Religion: Its Meaning and Proof*¹ states in the preface the purpose of his work. It is "an attempt to explain and verify the Christian religion by means of the fatherly-filial relationship." It is not intended, therefore, to be a compendium of Christian Evidences, but rather to set forth a point of view. The writer asserts that there is a widespread dissatisfaction with the ordinary systems of Christian Evidence. They are not in accordance with the demands of modern thought, especially in its emphasis upon the principle of continuity throughout the whole range

¹ *The Christian Religion: Its Meaning and Proof*. By J. Scott Lidgett, M.A. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1907. 516 pages. \$2.50.

of reality, upon the historic, comparative, and psychological points of view, and upon the experimental note in religion. Mr. Lidgett's restatement, accordingly, professes to be along the line of these demands and he endeavors all through the volume to knead these ideas into his treatment. It is especially the last one that may be called the fundamental thesis of his work, viz., that Christianity is true because it satisfies the needs of the soul as witnessed by the Christian consciousness.

The author divides his work into three books, of which the first deals with the history and task of the Christian Evidences. It is impossible to understand the present needs of apologetics without a survey of its history. Lidgett considers the apologetic content and method of the Old Testament and then of the New Testament. This history of Christian Evidences (for this term and apologetics are practically equated) is carried through the Middle Ages and modern times down to the present day. Considering the conciseness of the treatment, this historical survey is very good. In setting forth the inadequacy of the present systems of Christian Evidences, the writer declares that, besides not meeting the demands of modern thought, they have a wrong method. This method is, first to prove theism, then the need of revelation and redemption, and finally that this need is met in Christ and his gospel. This Lidgett declares to be an inversion of the actual successive stages of theological belief; men first believe in the divine through their religious consciousness, and this is true in all religions. It is only later that the idea of God emerges as the result of the speculative interpretation of the universe. There is, of course, truth in this statement, and the theistic writer should never forget that he is trying to justify not a mere hypothesis as to the divine existence, but a belief which, potentially at least, is universal and ineradicable. Nevertheless, Mr. Lidgett should see that what the apologist would regard as the most skilful method of marshaling the Evidences would depend not only upon his philosophical and theological view-point but also upon his practical judgment. Would the Ritschlian view-point and apologetic satisfy the writer? Not entirely. He recognizes elements of great value in it, especially because it emphasizes the historical facts of religion, and these facts in their relation to the satisfaction of the spiritual life. Nevertheless, the method denies to theoretic reason a real place and an ultimate function in world-interpretation, and wrongly sets nature and man in antagonism to each other.

In his second book on *Christianity as the Absolute Religion*, our author outlines the content of the Christian religion; for, as he says, we must know what a religion is before we can vindicate its truth. Lidgett is right here. Harnack's gibe that the apologists did not in general know what

they wished to defend, yet calmly proceeded to defend it, had the sting of partial truth in it. What is this apologetic area that the writer places before us? It is larger than many apologists would make, in fact it is practically the entire content of evangelical dogmatics. All of this, however, is the Christianity which in Mr. Lidgett's judgment Christian Evidences are called upon to vindicate as the absolute and final religion. In order to accomplish this task, he examines religion itself in general, its nature, origin, and relation to life, and discusses well its factors—finally laying down detailed tests by which all religions must be tried. In the light of these principles, the ethnic religions are passed in review, and their weaknesses and organic defects are pointed out. Finally, Christianity is exhibited as the fulfilment of religion, and as presenting a perfect synthesis of all the worthy elements contained in other religions.

But how can this subjective verification have universal validity? This is discussed in the third and last book, which is entitled *The Proof of the Christian Religion*. The primary argument advanced for the truth of Christianity is that it is indispensable to the full realization of the noblest human life, and that its consciousness of filial relationship to God gives abounding satisfaction and spiritual power.

The task remains to show that Christianity furnishes the only satisfactory explanation of the universe, and this is done by setting forth the world as an ordered whole, manifesting regular development, culminating in man with his civilization and religion, and fulfilled and mediated by Christ. The author's arrangement of his material here lacks, we are sorry to say, the orderly system which he is explicating and praising so highly in the universe. He very properly emphasizes general rather than specific teleology, and while admitting much truth in evolution as a process, points out that naturalism cannot make it work. Mr. Lidgett's discussion, brought in just here, of the problem of evil is excellent. The author in the next place shows how Christianity in its doctrine of man and redemption gives the only key to his nature, condition, destiny, and salvation. Finally, in the last chapter in the work the writer discusses the theistic belief as an object of strictly intellectual inquiry, i. e., he sets forth in detail the elements in the Christian idea of God given in revelation and worked out by the Christian consciousness, and shows how they are in accordance with the highest reason. To the objection that the Christian consciousness may be entirely subjective, and therefore may not point to any cause outside of itself, our author gives only a short and meager reply. In fact he betrays no knowledge whatever of the work done lately in the psychology of religion by such men as James, Starbuck, Coe, Pratt, and others.

In addition to the criticisms already made, we would say that one great defect of the work is its arrangement, which leads to overlapping divisions, a large amount of repetition, and therefore to prolixity. In his treatment of the revelation of God in the Scriptures, he does not touch upon the problems of Old Testament and New Testament criticism, which a work of this kind cannot afford to ignore. The author's reading, we should judge, had been more intensive than extensive. On the other hand, the work evinces long, earnest, and sometimes original thinking. It heads in the right direction by its emphasis on religious facts and experiences, by its use of the comparative method, and by its readiness to accept the results of modern philosophy and science. The author takes a comprehensive view of his subject, and his main thesis is consistently, even though somewhat awkwardly, worked out.

BENJAMIN LEWIS HOBSON

MCCORMICK THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

In the January number of this *Journal* appeared a notice of Vol. I of the new edition of Dr. Strong's work.² Since the reader is supposed to be familiar with the earlier editions of the treatise, attention is here confined to the changes introduced into this issue. These, proportionately the same as in the first volume, due to changes in Dr. Strong's philosophical and critical point of view, are determined by two principles: an ethical monism, and an evolutionary idea as to the origin and progress of the world.

According to the first of these principles, Christ is the exclusive revealer of God in nature, humanity, and Scripture. God's creative and providential activity is exercised through him alone. Second causes in nature are only constant and automatic workings of the First Cause. Only in the free will of intelligent beings has God detached from himself any portion of force, so that it is capable of opposition to his will. Miracles, like special providences, are simply different degrees of extraordinary nature.

In the section on good and bad angels he holds that the personality of Satan is as well grounded as the personality of the Holy Spirit, of God the Father, and even of the human soul. For confirmation of his belief in these spirits, he appeals to psychology, to the objective and subjective mind, to hypnotism and suggestion, and to "demon-possession" in non-Christian lands. And he adds, "Angels were created in Christ and consist in him;

² *Systematic Theology*; A compendium and commonplace book, designed for the use of theological students, by Augustus Hopkins Strong, D.D., LL.D., in three volumes. Vol. II. "The Doctrine of Man." Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press. xii + 371-776 pages. \$2.50.

he must suffer in their sin. God would save them if he could." For some of the fallen angels he holds out at least a possible hope.

In his doctrine of man he now declares that man was created, not "like the first introduction of life on this planet" (1st ed.), but through a divine reinforcement of the forces of life, not *from* but through the brute. The laws of organic development through which he originated as self-conscious, in the image of God, are divine methods and proofs of creatorship. By virtue of man's relation to the Eternal Son, there is a natural and physical sonship of all men, which antedates and prepares the way for spiritual sonship, thus conditioning the history of the fall and qualifying the doctrine of sin. Dr. Strong seems to have pared down the notion of original created righteousness to that of "holiness so far as this could belong to a yet untried being, i. e., to his tastes and dispositions prior to moral action."

He confirms his doctrine of sin by recent psychological discoveries concerning the unconscious and the subconscious elements in human character. Since man cannot be severed from the Eternal Word, no "soul is wholly given over to the power of evil." The doctrine of depravity receives an important modification (pp. 551, 552). On the other hand, it is still maintained that men are by inborn and original, not acquired, nature "children of wrath," and that physical death is part of the penalty of sin. His earlier doctrine of original sin is qualified (1) as the ethical interpretation of biological facts—hereditary and universal congenital ills, and (2) as correlated with ideas of original grace—the immanent God in every man of the race, in spite of his sin. Instead of reaffirming that Arminianism is wholly extra-Scriptural, he now confesses a large element of truth in its recognition of the universal gift of Christ, i. e., the natural light of reason and conscience, impulses to good struggling against evil, mitigating the effects of the fall and impelling men to salvation.

His ethical monism has influenced his theory of the person of Christ. He no longer objects to Dorner as pantheistic. Perhaps his most characteristic remarks here are the following: "We know of but one underlying substance and ground of being . . . self-limiting and so self-manifesting in Jesus Christ. . . . The Infinite Source has a finite manifestation; but in the finite we see the Infinite" (p. 699).

In his doctrine of the atonement which he designates as ethical he has inserted several interesting and profoundly modifying suggestions, the most significant of which is that the historical work of the incarnate Christ is not itself the atonement—it is rather the manifestation in space and time of the eternal suffering of God on account of human sin, without which "the age-long suffering of God could never have been made comprehensible

to men." He has not, however, throughout ethicised the doctrine of the atonement, since many of the old terms—punishment, payment of claims of justice, guilt of Adam's sin, bearing of penalty, suffering as penal—are still retained with much of their traditional meaning.

This volume, like the first, contains an amazing wealth of quotation drawn from wide circles of thought; sometimes the passages are more cogent and convincing than his refutation of them. The Scripture references are still printed in full, leaving nothing to be guessed by his readers. One is delighted that while he takes theology seriously, he has here and there inserted flashes of humor, as when he reports the colored physician whose method was "first to remove the disease and then to eradicate the system." In no other treatise will one find the traditional view so fully and clearly argued in the presence of modern thought. One wonders, however, how deep and far reaching the changes would be, if Dr. Strong were now to rewrite his entire system in the light of his newer principles—the Scriptures not infallible but sufficient for salvation, the universal immanent Christ, and evolution as the method of the transcendent personal Christ.

The method of theology is addition, never subtraction, except under necessity. When, therefore, a writer declares that "theology has been overloaded" and that she staggers under the burden, and at the same time offers to ease her of her load, although he knows she will resist, we are interested to ascertain first what part of the burden he proposes to unload, then on what principle he sets to work, and finally what is to be left. Dr. Johnson's aim in his book, with its apparently antithetic title,³ is to distinguish religious knowledge from theological inference. His fundamental principle, that the spiritual is real and certainly known, is coupled with the paradox, that "what we know best we know least;" "the objects of the Christian's deepest ignorance are objects of secure and indubitable knowledge." In working out this thesis under the lead of the critical principle, he analyzes one after the other traditional and prevailing theories concerning self, things, God, the Redeemer, the Paraclete, the future, and the Scriptures. The criticism, keen, central, unsparing, is judicial, reverent, evangelical, conclusive. With each new discussion entered upon, we wonder what if anything is to be left. But it is always inferences, theories, explanations that are discarded; the reality at the heart of revelation and Christian experience is unerringly seized upon and restored to its apostolic integrity, its spiritual authority. Here is agnosticism but not despair of the

³ *Christian Agnosticism as Related to Christian Knowledge*. By E. H. Johnson, D.D., LL.D. Edited with a biographical sketch and an appreciation by Henry C. Vedder. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1907. xxxii + 302 pages.

reason, since it is by reason that the results are reached; and the agnosticism is Christian, since it rests in the great verities which have been the content of Christian belief from the beginning. Both ministers and thoughtful laymen will find here a book which will drive them back from speculation and dogma to "the things which cannot be shaken."

CLARENCE AUGUSTINE BECKWITH

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

At a time when, as many seem to believe, an original and indigenous American philosophy—original and indigenous so far as any philosophy can be so—is at or at least near the hour of its birth, special interest and value must belong to such a historical survey of philosophy in America as Dr. Riley has undertaken.⁴ It is true that the single volume, recently published and now in review, covers only the "early schools" or in years the time roughly from 1600 to 1825; but this is only a first volume "to be followed by others in an historical series" (author's preface); for the period covered it is remarkably faithful and comprehensive, and it foreshadows, not only a proportionate thoroughness for the subsequent volumes, but also the probable method and standpoint of the whole history. This volume, then, for its particular period both more critical in its estimates and more comprehensive in its scope than Père van Becelaere's *La philosophie en Amérique*, which is the only other work at all comparable, introduces what will generally be recognized as the first serious and adequate history of American philosophy.

It is true, also, that Dr. Riley's history, to judge from this first installment, is to be rather objective than organic, rather a history giving material in a faithful and comprehensive way, tracing the succession of men and, above all, of isms in American philosophy, and showing the contacts of these among themselves and especially with the men and isms of other countries, than a history directly and consciously alive with a developing philosophical spirit or standpoint characteristically American. But, although Dr. Riley does find that America has used the philosophies of other countries with some originality or in a way more or less her own, and although in just so far he shows himself conscious or at least suspicious of an American quality in the philosophy that he reports, still with America's philosophical spirit not yet born, however near the hour of its birth, a vital and clearly conscious history, organic and purposeful, moving progressively to a certain definite end, was hardly to be expected. One cannot

⁴ *American Philosophy: The Early Schools*. By I. Woodbridge Riley, Ph.D. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1907. ix + 595 pages. \$3.50.

write of the forerunners of an unborn philosophy as of those of Socrates or Kant. The history, then, which this volume introduces, has interest and value for being, just by its comprehensiveness and by its objective and factual character, an important event or even a turning-point in the history of American philosophy. Being what it is, must it not greatly help to make or develop America's characteristic philosophy? Directly through what it is and indirectly through the studies, I suggest through the doctor's theses, that it is likely to stimulate, is it not bound to hasten America's philosophical liberation and so eventually to make possible the more conscious or more dramatic history against which, at least by implication, I was measuring it above? Certainly there is no extravagance in saying that America's philosophical independence will never be truly accomplished until she understands and respects herself sufficiently, that is, deeply and clearly enough, to make the scholarly study of her own past thinkers and their ideas as respectably intellectual or academically proper as that even of the ancient Greeks or the modern Germans. In thought and in time Ethan Allen was far from being a forerunner of Socrates or *even* of Hegel, but many a forerunner has owed his dignified place in history only to the accident of birth. Dr. Riley may not have written a very dramatic history; he may not show much real development in his succession of isms; but he has added materially to the interest and dignity of America's intellectual past.

It is true, thirdly, that—as already charged by at least one of his reviewers—Dr. Riley has sometimes cast his net very widely, making philosophy a very hospitable thing; but must not any history do just that? Must not any history be from the broad to the narrow, from the undeveloped and confused to the highly developed and differentiated expression of that with which it deals? Puritanism and Deism, for example, were not philosophies, but Dr. Riley is right in giving them large space, for history as well as poetry must have its license. Again, the introductory chapter on "Philosophy and Politics," although in my opinion better in conception than in execution, is both pertinent and important, for it shows in a special relation a regard for the origin of philosophy in actual life and in so far emphasizes the broad foundations of philosophy as to invite interest in other relations.

So we have here an important book, important both for what it is and for what it promises. Nor must anyone infer from what has been said that this book is valuable only materially or factually and is accordingly not very readable, being lacking in literary character. The book has indeed great material value, and it is the scholarly result of extensive research, requiring

just for this one volume over three years of study and involving investigations among rare works and unpublished manuscripts, but, more than this, in spite of some passages, such as that beginning on p. 88, too long to be quoted here, that are tangles of isms and ologies, and have rather the character of algebraic formulae than of stimulating literature, it is as a whole quite readable. No portion, perhaps, will be found more interesting than the series of chapters on Deism. To the rise and decline of this "reaction against Puritan determinism," involving all the important colleges of the time and summoning to its support men of widely different temperaments, if not also of even widely different views, such men, for conspicuous examples, as Mather, Chancy, Channing, Johnson, William Smith, Franklin, Jefferson, and Thomas Paine, Dr. Riley has succeeded in giving special life and interest. For the progressives in the history of American institutions deism was manifestly a valuable asset. Intellectually or philosophically its religious rationalism, though constantly suggestive of boiling ice, was of great service in the transition from Puritanism to the Transcendentalism of Emerson. "Without the [radical] deism of Paine," declares Dr. Riley, "there had been no Emerson."

Finally, the volume in review suggests for American philosophy what might be called an experience-meeting, the testimony given being mainly that the first motives to philosophy were religious or theological. America's early philosophers were, for the most part, theologians; her early isms were Puritanism, Anti-Puritanism, Deism, and the like; so that, whatever may be true of the subsequent volumes, which will be awaited with interest and confidence, this first volume concerns the theological student no less than the student of philosophy. Indeed all students of American ideas, whatever their special point of view, will find themselves indebted to Dr. Riley.

ALFRED H. LLOYD

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
ANN ARBOR, Mich.

Professor Watson has published a series of lectures⁵ that may be regarded as a continuation of the discussion in his earlier work, *Christianity and Idealism*. At the outset he discusses the problem of authority in religious belief. An examination is made of Cardinal Newman's views and their variations and modifications in the writings of Dr. Wilfrid Ward and Abbé Loisy. Against the view that the church must guarantee a faith that is supposed to be incomprehensible to reason it is affirmed that the history

⁵ *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*. By John Watson, Queen's University, Canada. Glasgow: Maclehose & Sons, 1907. xxvi+485 pages. 8s. 6d.

of religious growth is the genuine development of a living principle ever coming to clearer self-consciousness and indestructible because of its own inherent significance and truth.

A number of lectures follow, dealing with recent controversies in philosophy, special attention being given to the views of Professor James. Some keen criticisms of "pragmatism" will be found here especially in the note on "The Pragmatic Conception of Truth."

The author next discusses Harnack's historical method which is condemned because of its futile attempt to exclude philosophical interpretation. Against Harnack's static view of Christ's teaching in relation to which later theological or philosophical speculations are regarded as extraneous excrescences, the author affirms that Christ's teaching should be regarded as dynamically progressive and vitally informing in succeeding religious experience and thought. The influence of philosophical speculation on the development of Christian doctrine is traced through the Mediaeval and early modern period, with special attention to Philo, the gnostics, Augustine, Aquinas, and Leibnitz. The book concludes with a refutation of agnosticism, mysticism, and pantheism and a brief presentation of the author's views on the interrelations of God, world, and man from the standpoint of "constructive idealism."

In dealing with the vexed question of the origin and nature of evil it is said that "from the highest point of view evil is a necessary element in the development of a finite self-conscious being who only becomes good by the exercise of his freedom" and also that "free subjects only come to the clear consciousness of the higher through experience of the lower." Many who would admit the freedom would hesitate about making evil a "necessary element" "a lower" to be "experienced" to come to "clear consciousness of the higher," for this seems to be diametrically opposed to the view that evil is a stage in a descent not in an ascent, not a preparation for good but a perversion of it.

In more accordance with the usual opinion is the statement that "the teaching of Jesus was based upon his direct intuitions, not upon a process of scientific ratiocinations," but as it is on this theory that the Christian mystic rejects all "scientific ratiocinations" in his own procedure which is to be an *imitatio Christi*, the opponent of mysticism might well pause to ratiocinate a little more on this subject. Is it reasonable to suppose that the One who as a boy of twelve years of age was found in the temple with the teachers asking and answering questions would spend the later years of youth and manhood until he was thirty years of age without pondering deeply and often on those same questions of life, duty, and destiny?

It by no means proves that there has been no "scientific ratiocinations" and that everything has been secured by "direct intuitions" when results and details have been so fully and clearly thought out and comprehended that all the earlier tentative partial aspects have been superseded by complete mastery of the principles involved.

The book contains an excellent summary and index. It would improve the arrangement of the lectures if those on Kant and recent controversy were placed after Leibnitz where they belong chronologically.

In every part of the book subjects of long-standing debate have been so treated as to bring out the most recent phases of the controversy and it is scarcely necessary to add that these lectures will be warmly welcomed by many earnest students of philosophy and theology.

JAMES GIBSON HUME

TORONTO, CANADA

THREE BOOKS ON ORIENTAL MISSIONS

Books in China are out of date so quickly in these days, when the Occident expects some startling news from the Orient at least once a week, that the latest comer upon the library table is quite sure of attention, whatever its claims otherwise. The work¹ just now in hand bears an honored name upon its title-page, and presents beside so unusually attractive an appearance in paper, print, and photographic illustrations that one is reluctant to confess to a little disappointment in its contents. Dr. Martin's very timely theme as set forth in his preface is the explanation of the subterranean forces in which the social movement in China had its origin. This is an announcement to awaken large expectations, but it can hardly be said that the interesting promise of the preface is adequately kept. What is really offered is an informal, agreeable, chatty volume of personal experiences gained through a long residence in China, with reminiscences of distinguished Chinese officials. He would be ungrateful indeed who did not welcome cordially a contribution to our knowledge of eastern affairs made by one who has been contemporary with great events in the Middle Kingdom and held many responsible positions. From the time when the boom of British cannon in the Canton River, announcing the beginning of the opium war, turned his attention to China as a mission field, Dr. Martin has had a first-hand acquaintance with its foreign and domestic affairs. He was a sympathetic observer of the course of the Tai-ping rebellion. He was one of Mr. Reed's interpreters in the negotiation of the Treaty of

¹ *The Awakening of China*. By W. A. P. Martin, D.D., LL.D., formerly president of the Chinese Imperial University. Illustrated from photographs. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1907. 328 pages. \$3.80.